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Abstract 
Index-based insurance can have welfare-enhancing effects through two 
pathways: by mitigating weather-related shocks through payouts and by inducing 
policyholders to take greater yet more profitable risks. Most studies fail to 
distinguish between these two. Thus, we know little about which effects 
dominate and their long-term welfare implications. Using a random distribution 
of discount coupons and drought events that trigger payouts as exogenous 
variations, this study aims to identify both the ex ante risk-management and ex 
post payout effects of index insurance in a pastoral-dominant society of northern 
Kenya, where the presence of asset-based poverty traps, represented by 
bifurcated herd-size dynamics, has been established in the literature. We find the 
following: (1) Both risk-management and payout effects contribute to reducing 
the probability of distress sales of livestock; (2) payout effects also lead to a 
reduced slaughter of livestock; (3) while payout effects remain robust in a 
subsample of poorer households below the poverty trap threshold, risk-
management effects do not. Overall, our results suggest that insurance payouts 
assist people in escaping from poverty traps more effectively than do behavioural 
changes accompanied by insurance purchases.  
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1. Introduction 
Poor households in developing countries are highly vulnerable to weather-related risks. 
Since private insurance markets do not function well in the presence of asymmetric 
information, poor households have developed informal risk-management strategies, such 
as community mutual assistance and individual self-insurance. However, it is recognized 
that these informal insurance schemes cannot completely offset losses from aggregate 
shocks (Barret, 2011; Fafchamps et al., 1998; Kazianga and Udry, 2006; Morduch 1995, 
1999; Townsend, 1994).1 Uninsured risks have particularly important welfare 
implications in the face of a potential poverty trap based on asset level: shocks that push 
households’ asset level below a critical threshold force them into a downward spiral to 
extreme poverty from which they cannot escape over an extended period of time (Barnett 
et al., 2008; Carter and Barrett, 2006; Lybbert et al., 2004).  
To help farmers and pastoralists cope with weather risk and the chronic negative 
impacts of poverty traps, index insurance has been recently introduced in various 
developing countries (Barnett et al., 2008; Jensen et al., 2018; Miranda and Farrin, 2012; 
Smith, 2016; Takahashi et al., 2016). To overcome the inherent problems of conventional 
indemnity insurance such as moral hazard and adverse selection, as well as the high cost 
of loss verification, index insurance payouts are determined not by actual losses but by 
publicly observable exogenous indexes like rainfall, temperature, or vegetation levels 
(Cole et al., 2017; Gine et al. 2007; Miranda and Farrin, 2012). While the demand for 
index insurance is generally still low, the literature reveals that index insurance can 
benefit poor households through two channels (Bertram-Huemmer and Kraehnert, 2018; 
Cole et al., 2017; Hill et al., 2019; Matsuda et al., 2019). One is the effect on ex ante 
                                                   
1 Jack and Suri (2014) report that mobile money has recently made risk-sharing with distant places possible in Kenya. 
They find that consumptions among mobile-money users was not significantly affected by shocks. 
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resource allocation (hereafter ‘risk-management effect’), which enables rural households 
to invest in higher risk/higher return activities. The other is the compensation for ex post 
losses through payouts (hereafter ‘payout effect’), which helps rural households recover 
from shocks relatively quickly. The number of studies on the impacts of index insurance 
is growing, but less is known about the payout effect, as most studies focus exclusively 
on the ex ante risk-management effect or fail to distinguish between them (Cai et al., 
2015; Cole et al.,2017; Hill and Viczeisza, 2012; Karlan et al., 2014).  
This study aims to fill that research gap by identifying the relative importance of 
ex ante risk-management and ex post payout effects for welfare enhancement among the 
poor. The study draws on an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) project in an area of 
northern Kenya where the vast majority of dwellers depend on livestock production for 
their livelihood. Index-based livestock insurance was introduced in 2010 to protect 
livestock – the most important asset – against drought in this region, where the presence 
of a poverty trap based on the number of livestock holdings has been established in the 
literature (e.g. Lybbert et al., 2004; Santos and Barrett, 2011).  
We focus on the impact of IBLI sales on wealth and investment in livestock 
because of its importance for livelihoods in our research area; we consider factors such 
as total herd size, the probability of livestock selling, livestock slaughtering, and 
investments in vaccinations and veterinary services, along with total household income 
and food expenditure. To address potential problems caused by a self-selection of 
insurance uptake in our causal inferences, we use randomly distributed discount coupons 
as an instrument and employ the instrumental variable (IV) approach. To distinguish 
between the ex ante risk-management and ex post payout effects, we exploit the 
longitudinal nature of our data, which cover several post-insurance coverage periods (i.e. 
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2010–2012) with and without payouts. We assess the direct impact of payouts assuming 
that the existence of payouts is exogenous once endogenous uptake is controlled for, 
which is plausible given that payouts for the index insurance product under study are 
triggered based on a predetermined vegetation index that is exogenous to households’ 
decisions. Moreover, motivated by Janzen and Carter (2019) and Matsuda et al. (2019), 
who study the differential benefits of index insurance between the asset-poor and -rich, 
we conduct a subsample analysis on poor households whose initial herd size is below the 
critical poverty trap threshold established for our survey region by the literature in order 
to draw policy implications regarding the nexus between insurance uptake and long-term 
poverty.   
 Our empirical findings are as follows. While we find no direct evidence that 
households with payouts increase their herd size, we find that they are significantly less 
likely to reduce their livestock through distress sales or slaughter after a shock. Our results 
do not suggest that such decreases in selling and slaughter are associated with reduced 
food consumption or increased dependence on friends or relatives. We also find that those 
who purchase IBLI reduce their livestock sales even without payouts through the ex ante 
risk-management effect. Finally, we find that, while ex post payout effects remain robust 
in a subsample of poorer households below the poverty trap threshold, risk-management 
effects do not. Overall, our results suggest that insurance payouts play a more important 
role than behavioural changes induced by insurance uptake in moving the poor away from 
a poverty trap.  
 Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this study is the first to empirically distinguish the ex post payout effect of index insurance 
from the ex ante risk-management effect. Since a handful of studies on ex post effects 
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classify their sample households only into insured and uninsured types, the results of the 
ex post effect may include both risk-management and payout effects (Hill et al., 2019; 
Janzen and Carter, 2019; Jensen et al., 2017). It is thus not clear whether benefits such as 
increased income stem from promoting high-return activities through the risk-
management effect or from compensating losses through the payout effect after shocks 
occur. By isolating the impacts of insurance coverage periods with and without payouts, 
this study shows that IBLI helps prevent livestock reduction by both promoting 
investment and compensating losses via payouts, with the stronger effect being the latter. 
Second, our study is one of the first to examine the impact of index insurance in relation 
to poverty traps (Barnett et al., 2008; Chantarat et al., 2017; Janzen and Carter, 2019). 
The study verifies the hypothesis that index insurance payouts can help prevent pastoralist 
households from being trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty when a shock happens by 
prompting households to reduce their distress sales and livestock slaughter.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on index insurance impacts. Section 3 outlines the conceptual framework for 
the study’s poverty trap hypothesis. Section 4 describes our research setting and data. 
Section 5 describes the empirical models used to estimate the causal impact of insurance 
payouts. Section 6 provides the results of the estimation. Finally, Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Literature Review on Impacts of Index Insurance 
There have been growing studies on the benefits of index insurance in developing 
countries. These highlight two channels by which households are protected against 
weather risk: ex ante risk management and ex post payout effects.  
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 Most of the literature has focused on risk-management effects on farmers’ ex 
ante investment decisions. A common response to uninsured risk is to allocate limited 
resources to lower profit opportunities in order to reduce exposure to risk (Morduch 1995, 
1999; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). Studies have generally concluded  that index 
insurance encourages investment in higher risk activities that generate higher expected 
profits for various products, including crops, livestock, tobacco, and cotton (Cai, 2016; 
Cai et al., 2015; Elabed and Carter, 2014; Hill and Viczeisza, 2012; Miura and Sakurai, 
2015; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012). For example, Cole et al. (2017) find that 
insurance provision induces farmers to allocate more agricultural inputs to higher-return 
but rainfall-sensitive cash crops. Karlan et al. (2014) show that mitigating risk by 
providing index-based insurance leads rural Ghanaian farmers to invest more in their 
farms and increase their expected profits. Jensen et al. (2017) show that households with 
IBLI coverage in northern Kenya increase investments in livestock health.  
 While many studies have examined the ex ante risk-management effect, few 
papers have studied the ex post impacts, such as the impact of receiving payouts on 
household welfare after a shock. Among these few, Jensen et al. (2017) find that 
households with IBLI in northern Kenya reduce their distress sales of livestock during 
droughts and increase their income per adult equivalent. Janzen and Carter (2019) also 
study IBLI in northern Kenya and find that poorer households reduce their destabilizing 
food consumption, while richer households reduce their asset sales, both of which can be 
seen as serious long-term economic repercussions. Bertram-Huemmer and Kraehnert 
(2018) indicate that Mongolian households that receive IBLI payments have faster rates 
of recovery from shock-induced asset losses, including in herd size, than comparable 
uninsured households have one to three years after the shock but that the effect disappears 
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after four years. Hill et al. (2019) study the benefits of index crop insurance in Bangladesh 
and find that index insurance leads farmers to obtain higher yields and higher rice 
production through the provision and payouts of index insurance.  
 However, these studies may fail to isolate the ex post payout effect from the ex 
ante risk-management effect; the positive results for insurance products may thus include 
both. We identify the clean payout impacts on household wealth and welfare by focusing 
on the actual recipients of payouts besides those insured by IBLI. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework of Poverty Trap Hypothesis 
Several studies point out the existence of poverty traps based on herd size as measured 
by tropical livestock units (TLUs) in pastoral-dominant societies, including in our survey 
region (Barrett et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2007; Chantarat et al., 2017; Lybbert et al., 2004; 
Toth 2015).1 This is characterized by the bifurcated dynamics of livestock holdings with 
multiple equilibria, whereby household livestock assets above a certain threshold reach a 
high equilibrium while those below reach a low level.  
Figure 1 shows a conceptual framework on herd dynamics measured by TLUs at 
time t and t+1, with the presence of poverty traps. The diagonal degree line represents the 
point at which herd size at time t+1 is expected to be the same as the herd size at time t. 
If the herd size at time t is above the diagonal line, it grows over time until it reaches a 
high steady state; otherwise, it shrinks and eventually reaches a low steady state. In this 
framework, slipping into a poverty trap zone through temporal livestock losses can lead 
to chronic poverty.  
Following Chantarat et al. (2017), we assume the threshold TLU value in our 
                                                   
1 One TLU is equivalent to 1 cattle, 0.7 camel, or 10 sheep/goats. One TLU in a typical season is approximately 
equal to 20000 KSh. (Jensen et al., 2018) 
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survey region to be 15 per household, similar to the value used in previous studies on 
neighbouring communities in Ethiopia (Barret et al., 2006; Lybbert et al., 2004; Santos 
and Barrett, 2011).2 In this setting, it is important for households with or less than 15 
TLUs to increase their TLUs to climb out of the poverty trap and reach a high equilibrium. 
 
4. Research Setting and Data 
We use data drawn from the Marsabit district in northern Kenya covering 16 sub-
locations: Dakabaricha, Dirib Gombo, Sagante, Bubisa, El Gade, Kalacha, Turbi, Karare, 
Kargi, Kurkum, Logologo, Illaut, Lontolio, Loyangakani, Ngurunit, and South Horr. The 
Marsabit district is typical of Africa’s arid and semi-arid areas, where pastoral systems 
are dominant. A total of 924 sample households were randomly chosen in proportion to 
the number of households in each sub-location (Ikegami and Sheahan, 2017). Animal 
husbandry has long been a key element of economic and cultural identity in this area. The 
major species of livestock pastoralists in this region own are cattle, camels, goats, and 
sheep. In northern Kenya, there are usually two major rainy seasons per year. One is a 
long rainy season from March to May followed by a long dry season from June to 
September. The other is a short rainy season from October to December followed by a 
short dry season from January to February.  
 Although livestock is a key means of income generation, it comes with risks. In 
particular, pastoralists are often exposed to considerable risks due to frequent and severe 
droughts. Catastrophic herd losses are likely when rainfall is unexpectedly low, especially 
over two rainy seasons in a row (Chantarat et al., 2017). In this region, 28 major droughts 
                                                   
2 Note that these studies set various critical thresholds because the actual positions are unknown. Lybbert et al. 
(2004) estimate a threshold of 10 to 15, Barret et al. (2006) 10 to 12, Santos and Barrett (2011) seven to 10 TLUs per 
household.  
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have occurred over the last 100 years, four of which occurred in the last 10 years (Ikegami 
and Sheahan, 2017). Pastoralists suffer high livestock mortality during droughts because 
of the reduced vegetation, which their livestock eat. Lybbert et al. (2004) report that, 
during the cycle of drought and recovery, livestock mortality rates can reach as high as 
50%–80% for cattle and 30% for sheep and goats.  
Pastoralists facing a drought may sell their livestock, reduce consumption, or 
borrow money as a short-term coping strategy to mitigate shocks (Hazell et al., 2010). 
For example, Ngigi et al. (2015) show that climatic shocks negatively affect households’ 
livestock holdings through livestock sales and death. However, livestock sales may not 
fully compensate for losses in the face of covariate shocks because everyone is trying to 
sell livestock at the same time, thus reducing prices (Barrett et al., 2003; Fafchamps et al., 
1998). Following the poverty trap hypothesis, livestock reduction can cause households 
to slip into the poverty trap zone and then into long-term poverty (Chantarat et al., 2017). 
Therefore, maintaining herd sizes against shocks is extremely important for avoiding the 
poverty trap in the long run. 
 To help pastoralists manage devastating drought-related livestock mortality and 
hence long-term welfare losses, an IBLI pilot project was launched in the Marsabit district 
of northern Kenya in January 2010. IBLI uses the normalized differenced vegetation 
index (NDVI), a numerical indicator for vegetation availability recorded by satellite, as 
an index with which to predict livestock mortality rates. Since the IBLI in our study was 
carefully developed through longitudinal household-level herd data and NDVI, the basis 
risk – deviation of actual loss from loss predicted by index – could be minimized 
(Chantarat et al., 2012). One unique aspect of our IBLI is that discount coupons, which 
allow households to purchase IBLI cheaply, are distributed randomly.  
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 Table 1 reports the timeline of events related to this study. IBLI has been sold 
twice a year (August–September and January–February) since 2010. To purchase IBLI, 
households choose how many TLUs they want to insure for a given period. 3  The 
insurance premium, which is determined by regional livestock mortality risks, depends 
on the household’s sub-location. Payouts are triggered when the predicted livestock 
mortality index exceeds 15%, and the amount increases in proportion to the mortality 
index. This study focuses on the 2010–2011 East Africa drought, which caused high 
livestock mortality. In late 2010, rangelands began to decrease feed staff in areas that had 
gone without long rains. The average number of TLUs per household decreased rapidly 
during the drought.4 To study the impacts of IBLI on livestock wealth after the drought, 
a pre-intervention baseline survey was carried out in October and November 2009, and 
follow-up surveys were implemented three times annually between 2010 and 2012. From 
2009 to 2012, three IBLI sales occurred with uptake rates of about 26.7%, 13.5%, and 
13.2% for the first, second, and third sales periods, respectively. Payouts were triggered 
once in the second sales period and given to policyholders one year after their purchase. 
However, only about 8.2% of households with IBLI coverage were able to receive 
payouts; the rest of the insured were not eligible because their NDVI did not fall below 
the trigger point.  
Table 2 reports the baseline summary statistics for 2009. The average household 
size is 5.64, and 63% of household heads are male. The average age of the household 
head is 47.83. The household heads’ average years of education is only 1.18 year. Most 
of the households (92%) own livestock, and the average TLU holdings are 21.32. The 
                                                   
3 The first and second sales contracts covered from March to November, while the third covered from October to 
September of the following year.  
4 Our data show that average TLU holdings per household were 21.32 in 2009, 19.01 in 2010, 13.50 in 2011, and 
11.43 in 2012. 
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average annual income is only 46,790 Kenyan shillings (KSh).5 The average income 
share of livestock is 54%, meaning that their livelihood mostly depends on livestock 
activities. Some households use vaccination or other veterinarian services as investments 
in their livestock. Only 20% of households have savings. Their savings, weekly food 
consumption, and transfers received and sent total 6,880, 1,401, 2,287, and 654 KSh, 
respectively. The households’ average social group membership (e.g. women’s groups, 
youth groups) is 0.54. 
 To encourage households to purchase IBLI and generate exogenous variations in 
IBLI uptake, discount coupons were randomly distributed to sample households. In each 
sales period, 60% of the surveyed households were randomly chosen to receive the 
discount coupons offering a 10% to 60% discount on the first 15 TLUs insured.  
 To check the covariate balances according to the distribution of discount coupons, 
we compare key baseline household characteristics between the households that received 
discount coupons at least once and those that have never received them (see Table 3). As 
expected, few characteristics differ significantly between these two groups. Households 
that received coupons are less likely to be fully settled and more likely to have a female 
household head, less years of education, and more household members. Although 
discount coupons were randomly distributed and only few characteristics are significantly 
different, these variables jointly differ significantly between recipients and non-recipients 
(F = 2.189; p < 0.01). This imbalance may affect the estimation results. To avoid this 
problem, we include these household characteristics as control variables in the regressions 
below. 
 
                                                   
5 1 Kenyan shilling = 0.0097 USD in November 17, 2018 (https://www.xe.com/). 
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5. Estimation Strategy 
To measure clean payout effects, this paper focuses on whether households received 
payouts or not, in addition to insured by IBLI. Since the decision to insure is highly likely 
to be endogenous and to depend on unobservable household characteristics, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation may be biased. To mitigate these concerns, we employ an IV 
approach by using the average rate of the discount received as an instrument, which would 
be strongly correlated with the decision regarding IBLI uptake but would not be correlated 
with the error term because it is randomly distributed (Takahashi et al., 2016). 
 Using an IV approach, we estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of 
insurance uptake. We use the TLUs insured during the first, second, and third sales periods 
as key variables where policyholders in the second IBLI sales period are eligible to 
receive payouts.6 We do not separately examine the impact of each IBLI uptake period 
because considering multiple endogenous variables (TLUs insured at each period) would 
lead to an over-complex estimation and fragile results. We consider the TLUs insured 
rather than the number of IBLIs purchased during the three sales periods because the 
former is more closely related to the magnitude of welfare gain and loss.7  For the 
outcome variables, we rely on data drawn from the fourth-round survey to identify the 
short-term impacts of both risk-management and payout effects after the drought. We thus 
first predict the IBLI uptake of household i in sub-location j as follows: 
  
  𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡2𝑛𝑑3𝑟𝑑 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒋,𝟏𝒔𝒕𝟐𝒏𝒅𝟑𝒓𝒅 +
𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 (1)   
                                                   
6 No first-period IBLI payout was triggered in any sub-location, and the third-period IBLI payouts happened after 
our observation period. 
7 That said, our estimation results remain robust when we use the number of IBLI uptakes during the three sales 
periods instead of TLUs insured.  
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where 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡2𝑛𝑑3𝑟𝑑 is the total quantity of TLUs insured during the three 
sales periods, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡2𝑛𝑑3𝑟𝑑 is the average amount of discount coupons 
received in the three sales periods, 𝑋𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡  is a vector of baseline household 
characteristics – such as assets, household size, savings, and risk preferences8 – which 
can affect uptake, 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑗  represents sub-location fixed effects, and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is the error term. 
We cluster all standard errors at the sub-location level, allowing the correlation of error 
terms at this level.  
We then estimate the LATE of insurance and payouts on livestock assets and 
welfare outcomes in the round-four household survey using the following second-stage 
regression: 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗,4𝑡ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑̂ 𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡2𝑛𝑑3𝑟𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑷𝑨𝒀𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒊𝒋,𝟐𝒏𝒅 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗   (2)    
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗,4𝑡ℎ represents the outcomes of livestock assets and welfare status related to the 
poverty trap hypothesis in the round-four household survey. 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑̂ 𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡2𝑛𝑑3𝑟𝑑 
is the predicted TLUs insured obtained from the first-stage regression. 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑗,2nd is 
the total amount of payouts received in the second payout period. 𝑋𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡 and 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑗  
are again baseline household characteristics and sub-location fixed effects, respectively. 
𝑢𝑖𝑗  is an error term. In this model, we assume that, conditional on the number of 
purchases of IBLI, payouts can be treated as exogenous because whether households 
                                                   
8 To identify risk preferences, we conducted an experiment resembling a lottery that relies on a coin toss gamble in 
which risk and return are positively correlated. The respondents chose their preferences among six images of heads 
and tails sides; the possible heads–tails combinations were (A) 50 and 50, (B) 45 and 95, (C) 40 and 120, (D) 30 and 
150, (E) 10 and 190, (F) 0 and 200 (KSh). Those who chose (E) and (F) are categorized as risk-taking, and those who 
chose (C) and (D) are categorized as risk-moderate. See Ikegami and Sheahan (2017) for details. 
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receive them is determined solely by the realized NDVI, which household behaviour 
cannot affect. 
 In this regression, the payout effect is 𝛽2, whereas the risk-management effect 
is 𝛽1 because this coefficient shows the net impact of IBLI uptake on outcomes when 
there is no payout. Any statistically significant effect of 𝛽1  would indicate some change 
in preference or behaviour among the policyholders. Since the poverty trap hypothesis in 
our context is based on herd size, the effectiveness of payouts for avoiding the poverty 
trap is measured by 𝛽2 on livestock-related outcomes such as herd size and the number 
of livestock offtake after the drought. 
 To link our analysis with the poverty trap hypothesis, as in Janzen and Carter 
(2019), we employ the same regressions above on a subsample of households with poor 
TLUs (TLUs < 15), as discussed in Section III.  
 
6. Estimation Results 
Table 4 reports the result of the first-stage regression. The result shows a causal impact 
of the average value of discount coupons received on the total TLUs insured in the three 
sales periods. More precisely, a 1% increase in discount rates significantly increases the 
total TLUs insured by 0.0816 in the three periods.  
 Table 5 shows the results of the second-stage regression. The coefficients of 
interest are those for payout/1000,9 which capture ex post payout effects, and those for 
predicted TLUs insured, which capture ex ante risk-management effects. We first discuss 
the results of the former and then those of the latter.  
As column (1) shows, we find no direct evidence that receiving payouts increases 
                                                   
9 We divide the total amount of payouts by 1,000 for readability. 
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TLUs owned after the shock, which is in sharp contrast to Bertram-Huemmer and 
Kraehnert (2018), who suggest that IBLI payments significantly increase herd size in 
Mongolia. One possible explanation of our result is the small number of sample 
households that receive payouts, which may attenuate the impacts. Another possible 
explanation is the difference between the identification strategies used by the two studies: 
The previous results may include risk-management effects in addition to payout effects. 
 However, columns (2) and (3) report positive long-term implications for 
increasing herd sizes, showing that payouts significantly help pastoralist households 
avoid selling or slaughtering their livestock. These results are consistent with Gebrekidan 
et al. (2018), who reveal that purchasing IBLI significantly reduced the probability of 
herd offtake in the Borena zone of Ethiopia, which neighbours our survey region. Our 
results clearly suggest that receiving payouts helps maintain herd sizes when pastoralists 
suffer from drought.  
 Column (5) reports the payout effect on annual income after the drought. 
Although households with payouts are less likely to sell and slaughter their livestock, as 
discussed above, we find no evidence that their incomes increase. 
 While payouts seem to help maintain herd sizes, one potential concern may be 
that policyholders take other costly coping strategies against shocks. For example, those 
who suffer a drought may reduce consumption instead of selling their livestock, which 
may also jeopardize long-term welfare through loss of human capital (Hoddinott, 2006). 
However, such concerns seem inapplicable in our case. Columns (6), (7), and (8) report 
the payout effect on weekly food consumption, the amount of transfers given to friends 
or relatives, and the amount of transfers received from friends or relatives, respectively. 
There is no evidence that receiving payouts leads to significantly reduced consumption. 
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Nor do we find that payouts reduce reliance on others, as represented by transfers received. 
These results suggest that payouts prevent households from losing their livestock and do 
not cause them to take other costly risk-coping measures. 
 While payouts seem to have positive impacts on household livestock assets, we 
also find evidence of the risk-management effect on livestock assets, as reflected by the 
coefficient of predicted IBLI purchases. Our results show that the risk-management effect 
leads households to be less likely to sell their livestock, although we find no other 
significant effects.  
 In addition to the average treatment effects on the full sample of households, we 
also examine the effects on poor households by using only the subsamples.10 Table 6 
presents our estimation results for TLU-poor households.11 The results are similar to 
those for the full sample analysis, but several findings are worth noting. First, the 
statistically significant payout effects on reducing livestock sales and slaughter remain, 
but they are larger in magnitude for the poor subsample than for the full sample. This 
difference implies that poor households gain more benefits from IBLI through the payout 
effect. Second, we find no risk-management effects on the probability of livestock selling, 
although we do find some positive risk-management effects on savings and TLU 
slaughtering.12 These results support the view that insurance payouts are more helpful 
for escaping poverty traps in our context than are behavioural changes accompanied by 
insurance purchases.13   
                                                   
10 We also examine the effects on rich households. Unlike for poorer households, payouts have limited impacts on 
welfare improvement for richer households, presumably because the damage from drought exceeds the compensation. 
For details, see Appendix Tables 1 and Table 2 for the results of the first- and second-stage regressions, respectively. 
11 Similar to the average results above, discount coupons statistically increase demand among households with 
smaller TLUs for IBLI. See Appendix Table 3 for the first-stage regression of IBLI demand for poor households. 
12 Our further analysis of TLU slaughter reveals that its most significant cause is for use in ceremonies or to be 
hospitable to guests.  
13 To test the sensitivity of our results, we also employed the same regressions with another threshold, 12 TLUs, 
which Lybbert et al. (2004) propose. The results, available upon request, are similar to those for the subsample 
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7. Conclusion 
Index insurance has attracted increasing attention as a weather-related risk-mitigation 
device in developing countries. Previous studies show that purchasing index insurance 
leads households to invest in higher-risk and higher-return activities (e.g. Cole et al., 
2017). However, little is known about the direct impacts of insurance payouts on 
household welfare. Using a random distribution of discount coupons and exogenous 
drought-induced payouts as exogenous variables, this study identifies the causal ex ante 
risk-management and ex post payout effects of IBLI on livestock assets in the pastoral-
dominant region of northern Kenya, where the presence of poverty traps based on herd 
sizes has been established in the literature.  
 Our results reveal the existence of payout effects that help households avoid 
poverty traps. While we find no direct evidence that payouts significantly increase  herd 
sizes, households with payouts are significantly less likely to sell and slaughter their 
livestock, which is consistent with Jensen et al. (2017), Janzen and Carter (2019), and 
Gebrekidan et al. (2018). Our results do not indicate that payout effects lead to reduced 
consumption or increased transfers received from relatives or friends. While we also find 
that ex ante risk management causes the insured to be less likely to sell livestock, it has 
no other significant effect. Further subsample analysis shows that the aforementioned 
payout effects remain robust, whereas the risk-management effects disappear for poor 
households.  
 Two implications can be drawn from our findings. First, index insurance can help 
households through payouts after a shock, in addition to the ex ante risk-management 
                                                   
analysis above.  
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effects found in the literature. Second, index insurance may have positive impacts on 
long-term poverty, given that payouts help households maintain their herd sizes in areas 
where the poverty trap hypothesis has been based on herd size. 
 We acknowledge that our analysis has several limitations. First, some of the 
effects may not be statistically significant because the number of households who 
received payouts were limited. Contrary to Bertram-Huemmer and Kraehnert (2018), who 
find that IBLI has significantly positive impacts on herd size, we find no evidence that 
IBLI increases herd size through either risk-management or payout effects. Second, while 
our results provide suggestive evidence of the impact of IBLI against poverty traps, we 
cannot conclude that payouts actually have significant effects on long-term consequences. 
Although maintaining livestock is of significant value in our setting, we are not sure 
whether current payouts could shift the long-term steady state from lower to higher. 
Future research should examine long-term datasets and examine whether payouts actually 
prevent the poverty trap. 
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Figure 1: Poverty Trap Hypothesis 
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Table 1: Timeline of IBLI Events 
October-November 2009 Household survey round 1  
January-February 2010  1st IBLI sales period (without payouts) 
October-November 2010 Household survey round 2  
January-February 2011 2nd IBLI sales period (with payouts) 
August-September 2011 
3rd IBLI sales period (Payouts occurred 
after Household survey round 4) 
October-November 2011 Household survey round 3  
October-November 2011 
1st IBLI indemnity payout period (No 
payouts because index was not triggered)  
March-April 2012 2nd IBLI indemnity payout period 
October-November 2012 Household survey round 4 
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Table 2: Baseline Household Characteristics 
  Mean SD Max Min 
Household characteristics     
Household size 5.64 2.38 15 1 
Household head information     
Male head dummy (=1 if household head is male) 0.63 0.48 1 0 
Age of head 47.83 18.38 98 18 
Education of head (Years) 1.18 3.3 16 0 
Household Economy     
Livestock own dummy (=1 if household own camels, 
cattle, goats, and sheep) 
0.92 0.26 1 0 
Owned livestock (TLUs) 21.32 31.07 359.3 0 
Annual household income (KSh) 46790 1021301 1602000 0 
Income ratio of livestock (Income from livestock/income) 0.54 0.46 1 0 
Vaccinations and other veterinarian services (KSh) 762 1864 36000 0 
Saving dummy (=1 if household have savings) 0.2 0.4 1 0 
Saving amount (KSh) 6880 58545 1500000 0 
Weekly food consumption (KSh) 1401 8312 11280 10 
Transfer received amount (KSh) 2287 9202 202000 0 
Transfer given amount (KSh) 654 31670 55300 0 
Social groups (number of social groups participating in) 0.54 0.8 4 0 
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Table 3: Balancing Tests 
   By Discount Coupon 
  
 
No coupon Received coupon 
Difference in 
means 
Permanently settled (dummy=1 if true)  0.310 0.224 0.086* 
   [0.046] [0.015]  
Age of household head  45.640 48.106 -2.466 
   [1.739] [0.650]  
Age of household head squares  2382.500 2655.639 -273.139 
   [195.413] [73.463]  
Gender of household head (dummy=1 if 
head is male) 
 
0.780 0.607 0.173*** 
   [0.042] [0.017]  
Years of education of household head  2.200 1.057 1.143*** 
   [0.433] [0.110]  
Household size  5.250 5.690 -0.440* 
   [0.271] [0.082]  
Risk-taking (dummy=1 if risk-taking)  0.340 0.273 0.067 
   [0.048] [0.016]  
Risk-moderate (dummy=1 if risk 
moderate) 
 
0.360 0.445 -0.085 
   [0.048] [0.017]  
Amount of savings (KSh)  4954.000 7117.614 -2163.614 
   [2303.545] [2163.365]  
Number of TLUs owned  22.580 21.169 1.411 
   [2.847] [1.104]  
Value of non-livestock asset (KSh)  53252.930 40826.305 12426.625 
   [36963.260] [12407.064]  
Cultivating land (acre)  0.000 0.001 -0.001 
   [0.000] [0.000]  
Muslim (dummy=1 if true)  0.300 0.229 0.071 
   [0.046] [0.015]  
Catholic (dummy=1 if true)  0.290 0.303 -0.013 
   [0.046] [0.016]  
Traditional (dummy=1 if true)  0.270 0.313 -0.043 
   [0.045] [0.016]  
26 
Social groups (Number of groups 
participating in) 
 
0.490 0.541 -0.051 
   [0.076] [0.028]  
Observations  100 809  
F-test of joint significance (F-stat)    2.189*** 
Observations    909 
Note: Standard errors and standard errors of the difference in means are reported in brackets. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: First-stage Regression on Demand for IBLI 
  (1) 
VARIABLES TLUs insured 
Average percentage of discount coupons received 0.0816*** 
 (0.0246) 
Constant -0.704 
 (0.828) 
Area fixed effect Yes 
Observations 909 
Adj R-squared 0.173 
F-stat 410.18 
Note: Clustered standard errors at sub-location level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1. Controls include Number of TLUs owned, a dummy variable for fully settled, household size, years of 
education of head, age of head, age of head squared, gender of head, a dummy variable for risk-taking, a 
dummy variable for risk-moderate, the amount of savings (KSh), the amount of non-livestock asset (KSh), 
the ratio of livestock related-income per income, cultivated lands (acre), number of group memberships, a 
dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Anglican, a dummy variable for other Christian, a 
dummy variable for Muslim, and a dummy variable for traditional religion. 
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Table 5: Local Average Treatment Effect of IBLI on Outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 
TLUs 
owned 
Probability of 
livestock selling 
TLUs 
slaughtering 
Vaccinations and 
veterinary services 
Household 
income 
Food 
consumption 
Transfer 
given 
Transfer 
received 
Saving 
amount 
Predicted 
TLUs insured 
0.322 -0.0277** 0.0219 -6.491 -3,892 2.218 210.3 -373.5 1,619 
 (0.281) (0.0121) (0.0148) (23.40) (3,020) (15.71) (183.3) (684.5) (962.2) 
Payout/1000 -0.120 -0.0265*** -0.00817** -12.82 -1,664 14.94 56.83 557.2 -18.71 
 (0.137) (0.00803) (0.00361) (10.86) -3,892 2.218 (260.0) (651.8) (720.7) 
Constant -8.141** -0.135 0.173 -650.6*** -67,627** -397.3* 2,671* -4,924 -4,606 
 (3.058) (0.149) (0.102) (155.6) (30,158) (203.3) (1,356) (3,596) (9,046) 
Area fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Adj R-squared 0.270 0.335 0.141 0.172 0.261 0.358 0.175 0.139 0.136 
Note: Clustered standard errors at sub-location level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls include Number of TLUs owned, a dummy 
variable for fully settled, household size, years of education of head, age of head, age of head squared, gender of head, a dummy variable for risk-taking, a dummy 
variable for risk-moderate, the amount of savings (KSh), the amount of non-livestock asset (KSh), the ratio of livestock related-income per income, cultivated lands 
(acre), number of group memberships, a dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Anglican, a dummy variable for other Christian, a dummy variable for 
Muslim, and a dummy variable for traditional religion. 
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Table 6: Local Average Treatment Effect of IBLI: Subsample Analysis with TLUs < 15 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 
TLUs 
owned 
Probability of 
livestock selling 
TLUs slaughtering 
Vaccinations and 
veterinary services 
Household 
income 
Food 
consumption 
Transfer 
given 
Transfer 
received 
Saving 
amount 
Predicted 
TLUs insured 
0.0424 -0.0228 0.0175** 26.01 3,743 3.910 353.2 375.2 2,736** 
 (0.268) (0.0151) (0.00729) (24.39) (3,091) (19.25) (263.6) (754.8) (1,252) 
Payout/1000 -0.166 -0.0329*** -0.00906*** -9.429 -3,288 18.79 -103.2 98.76 120.9 
 (0.148) (0.00838) (0.00193) (17.33) (2,277) (12.29) (175.4) (455.1) (743.7) 
Constant -5.175* -0.393** 0.0380 -609.2** -62,969 -358.2 3,868** -5,638 -8,445 
 (2.514) (0.162) (0.103) (220.2) (39,401) (250.2) (1,739) (5,860) (10,646) 
Area fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 
Adj R-squared 0.284 0.286 0.103 0.145 0.354 0.357 0.161 0.120 0.142 
Note: Clustered standard errors at sub-location level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls include Number of TLUs owned, a dummy 
variable for fully settled, household size, years of education of head, age of head, age of head squared, gender of head, a dummy variable for risk-taking, a dummy 
variable for risk-moderate, the amount of savings (KSh), the amount of non-livestock asset (KSh), the ratio of livestock related-income per income, cultivated lands 
(acre), number of group memberships, a dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Anglican, a dummy variable for other Christian, a dummy variable for 
Muslim, and a dummy variable for traditional religion.
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Appendix Table 1: First-stage Regression about Subsample Demand for IBLI (TLUs ≧ 15) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES TLUs insured 
Average percentage of discount coupons received 0.0733** 
 (0.0280) 
Constant -2.761* 
 (1.343) 
Area fixed effect Yes 
Observations 360 
Adj R-squared 0.181 
Note: Clustered standard errors at sub-location level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1. Controls include Number of TLUs owned, a dummy variable for fully settled, household size, years of 
education of head, age of head, age of head squared, gender of head, a dummy variable for risk-taking, a 
dummy variable for risk-moderate, the amount of savings (KSh), the amount of non-livestock asset (KSh), 
the ratio of livestock related-income per income, cultivated lands (acre), number of group memberships, a 
dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Anglican, a dummy variable for other Christian, a 
dummy variable for Muslim, and a dummy variable for traditional religion. 
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Appendix Table 2: Local Average Treatment Effect: Subsample Analysis with TLUs ≧ 15 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 
TLUs 
owned 
Probability of 
livestock selling 
TLUs 
slaughtering 
Vaccinations and 
veterinary services 
Household 
income 
Food 
consumption 
Transfer 
given 
Transfer 
received 
Saving 
amount 
Predicted TLUs 
insured 
0.944 -0.0339 0.00957 -25.07 -16,865* 14.10 148.3 -1,326 -406.7 
 (0.738) (0.0226) (0.0351) (48.12) (8,355) (15.94) (238.7) (857.8) (1,708) 
Payout/1000 -0.871** 0.0358 0.0290 -42.18 -3,957 -40.86*** 1,402*** 3,064*** -6,455*** 
 (0.405) (0.0225) (0.0178) (42.86) (5,019) (10.25) (161.0) (903.4) (936.2) 
Constant -10.46* 0.178 0.360** -364.5 -116,184* -129.6 -169.3 -4,662 2,189 
 (5.201) (0.189) (0.170) (561.1) (58,027) (137.6) (2,240) (6,253) (9,388) 
Area fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 
Adj R-squared 0.115 0.411 0.0839 0.219 0.204 0.391 0.306 0.248 0.131 
Note: Clustered standard errors at sub-location level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls include Number of TLUs owned, a dummy 
variable for fully settled, household size, years of education of head, age of head, age of head squared, gender of head, a dummy variable for risk-taking, a dummy 
variable for risk-moderate, the amount of savings (KSh), the amount of non-livestock asset (KSh), the ratio of livestock related-income per income, cultivated lands 
(acre), number of group memberships, a dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Anglican, a dummy variable for other Christian, a dummy variable for 
Muslim, and a dummy variable for traditional religion.
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Appendix Table 3: First-stage Regression about Subsample Demand for IBLI (TLUs < 15) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES TLUs insured 
Average percentage of discount coupons received 0.0895** 
 (0.0315) 
Constant -0.514 
 (0.966) 
Area fixed effect Yes 
Observations 549 
Adj R-squared 0.195 
Note: Clustered standard errors at sub-location level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1. Controls include Number of TLUs owned, a dummy variable for fully settled, household size, years of 
education of head, age of head, age of head squared, gender of head, a dummy variable for risk-taking, a 
dummy variable for risk-moderate, the amount of savings (KSh), the amount of non-livestock asset (KSh), 
the ratio of livestock related-income per income, cultivated lands (acre), number of group memberships, a 
dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Anglican, a dummy variable for other Christian, a 
dummy variable for Muslim, and a dummy variable for traditional religion. 
